INTRODUCTION
There are hundreds of Canadians serving prison sentences in other countries, most of them in the United States of America. There are also many foreign nationals serving prison sentences in Canada. 1 In order to ensure that Canadians
CONDITIONS THAT HAVE TO BE MET FOR AN OFFENDER TO BE TRANSFERRED TO SERVE HIS SENTENCE IN CANADA
The conditions that have to be met before an offender is transferred to serve his sentence in Canada are found in the multilateral treaties that Canada has ratified, 7 the bilateral treaties it has signed with other countries, 8 and in the ITOA.
These conditions are: 9 the conduct for which the offender was sentenced is one which is punishable as a crime in the sentencing state and in Canada; 10 the offender is a citizen of Canada; 11 the person has not been convicted of a strictly military offence; 12 at least six months of the sentence remain to be served at the 6 Ibid., para 51; see also para 55. 7 For the conditions of transfer in multilateral treaties, see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Handbook on the International Transfer of Sentenced Persons (New York, 2012) , p. 25 -42. 8 For the official citations of these treaties see Jamil D. Mujuzi, supra note 1: 2-3. 9 It should be noted that some conditions are included in some agreements and not in others. 10 his sentence in Canada, the minister is governed by section 10 of the ITOA which provides that he "may consider the following factors":
(a) whether, in the Minister's opinion, the offender's return to Canada will constitute a threat to the security of Canada; (b) whether, in the Minister's opinion, the offender's return to Canada will endanger public safety, including (i) the safety of any person in Canada who is a victim…of an offence committed by the offender, (ii) the safety of any member of the offender's family, in the case of an offender who has been convicted of an offence against a family member, or (iii) the safety of any child, in the case of an offender who has been convicted of a sexual offence involving a child; (c) whether, in the Minister's opinion, the offender is likely to continue to engage in criminal activity after the transfer; (d) whether, in the Minister's opinion, the offender left or remained outside Canada with the intention of abandoning Canada as their place of permanent residence;
(e) whether, in the Minister's opinion, the foreign entity or its prison system presents a serious threat to the offender's security or human rights; (f) whether the offender has social or family ties in Canada; (g) the offender's health; (h)
whether the offender has refused to participate in a rehabilitation or reintegration program; (i) whether the offender has accepted responsibility for the offence for which they have been convicted, including by acknowledging the harm done to victims and to the community; (j) the manner in which the offender will be supervised, after the transfer, while they are serving their sentence; (k) whether the offender has cooperated, or has undertaken to cooperate, with a law enforcement agency; or (l) any other factor that the Minister considers relevant.
Before March 2013, the ITOA obliged the Minister to consider some of the factors above in deciding whether or not to consent to the transfer of an offender to Canada. The ITOA was amended and the word 'shall' in section 10(1) was replaced by the word 'may' to give the minister wider discretion in exercising his power to consent to the transfer of an offender to serve his sentence in Canada. The number of factors that the minister is to consider was also increased. 22 Our attention now turns to the Supreme Court judgement.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND THE ISSUES THAT THE COURT HAD TO

RESOLVE
In March 1995 Mr Davito was convicted by a Canadian court of conspiring to import and traffic cocaine and he was sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment. have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
The majority emphasised Article 12 (4) . The majority also referred to the Human Rights Committee's General Comment No 27 on the question of the meaning of 'arbitrary' under article 12 (4) Given that in some cases the objectives of the ITOA would be served by refusing a transfer based on the factors set out in ss. 10(1)(a) and 10(2)(a), the Minister's discretion to consider these factors on a case-by-case basis is rationally connected to the pressing and substantial objectives of these provisions. In addition, at least in some cases, refusing a transfer based on the challenged factors will be the sole -and therefore the most minimally impairing -alternative open to the Minister. In light of both the binary nature of the Minister's decision and the citizen's continued incarceration, it is difficult to conceive of a less drastic means of achieving Parliament's protective purpose.
Finally, in our view, the impugned provisions are proportionate in their effectthat is their effects do "not so severely trench on individual or group rights that the legislative objective, albeit important, is nevertheless outweighed by the abridgement of rights". 
ANALYSING THE JUDGEMENT AND HIGHLIGHTING ITS HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS
The following section will analyse the judgement and highlight its implications.
The author will also demonstrate that the judgement, read in light of Canada's national and international human rights obligations, creates an opportunity for the issue of human rights to be brought to the fore in making the decision of whether or not the offender should be transferred to serve his sentence in Canada once the sentencing state has consented to the transfer.
The first point relates to the interpretative approaches that the court invoked to deal with the issues that were raised. As indicated earlier, the court referred to the ICCPR and to the Human Rights' Committee General Comment 27 in interpreting the meaning of the right to enter Canada as provided for under section 6(1) of the Charter. In justifying why it had invoked the ICCPR, the court held that that treaty was binding on Canada because Canada has ratified it. This should be understood against the background that unlike the constitutions of some countries such as South Africa, 71 and Malawi 72 which expressly empower courts to refer to international law in interpreting the bill of rights, the Canadian Charter does not expressly allow courts to refer to international law in interpreting the Charter. The implication for the ruling is that the court has continued with its practice of referring The drafting history of Article 12 (4) (4), and indeed the whole of the ICCPR was being debated, the issue of the transfer of offenders from one country to another was on the international agenda, 78 the author is not aware of any country which proposed that one of the grounds that could or could not be invoked to limit 74 I should hasten to add that even the minority judgement does not refer to the drafting history of Article 12 (4) [T]he Committee notes that the author was not forced into exile by the State party's authorities…but left the country voluntarily, and that no laws or regulations or State practice prevented him from returning to Cameroon. As the author himself concedes, he was able to return to his country in April 1992;
even if it may be that his return was made possible, or facilitated, by diplomatic intervention, this does not change the Committee's conclusion that there has been no violation of article 12, paragraph 4, in the case.
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In Luis Asdrúbal Jiménez Vaca v. Colombia 86 the Human Rights Committee held that:
[C]onsidering the Committee's view that the right to security of person (art. 9, para. 1) was violated and that there were no effective domestic remedies allowing the author to return from involuntary exile in safety, the Committee concludes that the State party has not ensured to the author his right to remain in, return to and reside in his own country. Paragraphs 1 and 4 of article 12 of the Covenant were therefore violated.
87
The above communications and practice show, inter alia, that there are different ways through which a person's right to enter his country could be violated.
These include the existence of laws, regulations or state practices which make it impossible for him to return to his country or the fact that security situation is of such a nature that his return to the country would be risky. In light of the above drafting history of the ICCPR and the practice and jurisprudence from the Human Rights Committee, the author wishes to emphasize here that the minority were right in concluding that relevant sections of the ITOA indeed infringed on the offender's right to enter Canada but that that infringement did not render the relevant provisions unconstitutional or contrary to Canada's international human rights obligations as the right to enter one's country is not absolute.
Related to the above is the issue of whether an offender has a right to be transferred to serve his sentence in Canada once the sentencing state has consented to the transfer. The Court, both the minority and the majority, agreed that an offender does not have the right. 16 -17. 90 Plepi v Albania and Greece, 51 EHRR 3, 53 (2010) .
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Supreme Court's judgement leaves room for the argument that there could be cases where the Minister will be obliged, on human rights grounds, to consent to the offender's transfer to Canada once the sentencing state has consented to the transfer. This is the issue to which our attention now shifts.
It has been illustrated above that the minister has various factors to consider in determining whether or not to allow the offender to be transferred and serve his sentence in Canada. As mentioned above, the court held that in exercising his discretion the minister must act reasonably. 91 The implication is that if he declines to consent to the offender's transfer on unreasonable grounds, courts will be in a position to set aside the minister's decision. Evidence shows that in the past Canadian courts have set aside the minister's decisions not to consent to the transfer of offenders where they have found the decisions to have been based on unreasonable grounds. 92 In one case the minister was ordered to consent to the offender's transfer within a few weeks. 93 It would appear that the Supreme Court decision raises new issues that could be invoked to compel the minister to consent to the transfer of an offender to Canada -in other words, the presence of these issues could be invoked to successfully argue that the minister's decision not to consent to the offender's transfer was unreasonable.
In coming to the conclusion that a Canadian national who has been convicted of an offence in a foreign country does not have the right to be transferred to serve his sentence in Canada, the court held that such an offender is "lawfully incarcerated" in that country after having been "lawfully convicted in a foreign jurisdiction." 94 In the author's view this holding raises the question of whether an offender who has been imprisoned in a foreign country after having been unlawfully convicted could invoke that as an argument to motivate for his transfer to Canada.
This scenario could arise in a case where the person in question was convicted after a trial which did not meet international human rights standards -that is, where there was a flagrant denial of justice; or, for example, where the evidence which was relied on by the court for his conviction was obtained through torture. prison on the basis that such programmes are irrelevant to him or if there are no rehabilitation programmes in the prison in question, the offender could argue that his transfer should be approved so that he is rehabilitated in Canada. Although the Court held that in some cases the objectives of the ITOA would also "be served by refusing a transfer based on the factors set out in [sections] 10(1)(a) and 10(2)(a)" 102 it is difficult to think of a situation where the object of the Act would be achieved by refusing to consent to the offender's transfer on the basis that he has refused to take part in rehabilitation programmes he considers to be useless or where he is being imprisoned in prison where there are no rehabilitation programmes at all.
CONCLUSION
In this article I have discussed the Supreme Court of Canada's judgement which dealt with the issue of whether sections 8(1) and 10(1)(a) and section 10(2)(a) of the ITOA were contrary to section 6(1) of the Charter. I have illustrated how the majority and the minority relied on international law, previous court decisions and academic publications to resolve the issues that they were dealing with. I have also agreed with the minority that the majority erred by adopting the approach they adopted. In my view, both the majority and the minority could have enriched their decisions if they had referred to the drafting history of Article 12 (4) of the ICCPR and to more jurisprudence and practice from the Human Rights Committee. Although the decision dealt with two sections of the ITOA, the judgment is applicable to all the relevant factors in the ITOA that the minister may consider in deciding whether or not to consent to the offender's application to be transferred and serve his sentence in Canada. The appropriate test to be applied in all cases in which the offender is challenging the minister's decision not to consent to his transfer to Canada is whether the minister "exercised [his discretion] reasonably, including in compliance with relevant Charter values." 103 In other
